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It always seems befitting that the last speaker at a conference
should gaze at a crystal ball and predict the future of the subject that has
been discussed; I feel I should quote Confucius by saying that I do not invent,
but transmit.
In the last ten years, since the Elsinore Conference on Classification
Research, classification theory and practice have produced a large body of
literature and contributed to meetings such as this one. Major futuristic works,
especially Classification in the 1970's,^ which was published early in this
decade, provide the reader with a clear insight of what the future holds for
each topic covered. J. Mills states of Bliss's Bibliographic Classification that
"as a library classification scheme per se, the prospect is clear and bright," but
"from the point of view of its future use, the prospect is less predictable."2
Bibliographic Classification (BC) is being revised because some ninety libraries
use it and need a revised edition. Presently, no BC class numbers are provided
from centralized cataloging services such as British National Bibliography,
MARC tapes, etc. However, Mills asserts that if demand warrants it: "This
might involve the development of a 'switching language' whereby the subject
analysis and description implicit in the production of PRECIS index
entries . . . could be translated quickly and economically into BC numbers."-^
Gopinath writes that the third version of the Colon Classification (CC) is
tending to become a freely faceted analytico-synthetic scheme:
157
158 PA ULE ROLLAND-THOMAS
It is now possible for the notational system of CC to place any new
main subject, or non-main subject simple or compound in any facet in
the helpful position determined by the idea plane. . . . Thus during the
next decade the development of CC will be approximate to the ideal of
a freely-faceted model of classification.^
According to Sarah Vann, the flexibility of notation in Dewey's Decimal
Classification (DDC) will contribute to its internationalization:
This flexibility is to be 'controlled' through the inclusion of notes telling
where to class subjects displaced. How long the 'official' Dewey will
remain official in use, therefore, is highly speculative until further study
is made. It can be assumed, however, that the use of the basic text both
by the British national bibliography and the Decimal Classification
division of the Library of Congress will continue to insure authoritative
interpretation of notation.
->
This prompts me to question the desirability and the practical value of a
truly international scheme; varied cultures, national differences, distinct sys-
tems of values (even among countries in the Western world) have already
shown that DDC is inadequate in some areas, namely the 100s, 200s, and
300s.
J.P. Immroth has invested a lot of energy, thought and research on the
Library of Congress Classification (LCC).^ He deserves credit, I believe, for
the first groundwork in building a theoretical approach to LCC, (fragile as it
may be). I feel that the future of this scheme lies in its keeping up with the
development of knowledge in its own enumerative manner and not in trying
to imitate other schemes. The wealth of words contained in the schedules, the
indexes to the schedules, and the lists of subject headings should allow for
further research on the homologation and structural model building of the
scheme and its ancillaries.
The Universal Decimal Classification (UDC) development program for
the 1970s has been described by G.A. Lloyd7 Funded partly by the
International Federation for Documentation (FID) and partly through
UNESCO, the program may be considered in four phrases, in addition to the
normal revisions. They are:
1) immediate elaboration of a UDC "roof scheme" capable of fulfilling
the role of international switching language in multilingual and
multidisciplinary information systems, especially of an international
or large-scale nature;
2) extended studies on the use of UDC combined with coordinate-
indexing schemes, thesauri or special-subject classifications, and the
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compilation of appropriate concordances, as means to improving
information retrieval systems generally;
3) short-term priority projects, mainly FID-funded, to improve or rem-
edy defective or deficient parts of the existing UDC schedules;
4) further perspectives of structural and notational improvements of a
more far-reaching nature.**
Although Vickery's paper on classificatory principles in natural-language
indexing systems^ presents a sound explanation of the underlying classifica-
tory technique in indexing, no new ventures in this particular area are
foreseen.
In his paper, "Prospects for Classification Suggested by Evaluation Tests
Carried Out 1957-1970," E.M. Keen questions the benefits of classificatory
index languages on the ground that their logical foundations may be at fault.
In providing controlled languages their artificiality and complexity
introduce new opportunities for misunderstanding and error. But an-
other answer may be that the logical foundation presupposes a false
view of the objectives of document retrieval systems. Users rarely
require to see every single fully and marginally relevant document in a
particular file, and they do not always expect that every non-relevant
document in the file can be withheld. * *
He concludes that the next decade will see different kinds of information
retrieval systems manual, mechanized and new ones approaching automation.
Keen deduces:
On considerations of retrieval performance there is ample evidence that,
in the kind of situations covered by tests so far, relatively uncontrolled
languages used at the indexing stage cannot be improved on by
controlled languages, and that in many cases even the use of controlled
language aids at the search stage will not be necessary.
* 1
For the sake of thoroughness, I will summarize Derek Austin's viewpoints as
presented in his paper on trends toward a compatible general system." In
this paper, he has outlined and discussed postulates and findings of the
Classification Research Group as they relate to that group's approach to
classification. Plans for research into a new general classification scheme were
laid down at the London Conference in 1963.13 Throughout the years, the
plans have evolved from a fairly conventional faceted classification scheme to
the assignment of concepts "in a once-and-for-all basis to general categories
from which they can be selected as needed in the building of any compound
subject." 14
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PRECIS, as Austin writes, "should be seen rather as an interesting
by-product of the continuing search for a general classification scheme."^ Its
strings have been rotated to produce sets of entries that are meaningful in
languages other than English. Recent developments in linguistics (namely
Chomsky's school) have contributed to classification research insofar as it
"supports the hypothesis of a deep syntactic structure which is common to all
language systems."
1
Therefore, the goal of the CRG research is to produce a
"metalanguage which is capable of expressing any subject as a string of
notated elements which is neutral with respect to: (a) the placing of the
subject in various standard shelf order classifications, (b) the categorial frame-
work of the user of the system, and (c) the words and syntax of any one
natural language."
* '
Robert Freeman concludes his discussion of "Classification in Com-
puter-Based Information Systems of the 1970's" with the statement:
The matter of switching among existing classifications and indexing
languages used in machine-readable data bases probably will continue to
be subject of considerable effort throughout the 1970's. A variety of
classifications will continue to thrive in the context of computer-based
systems, both as file-partitioning and as detailed subject searching
devices. Large-scale use of automatic classification techniques is probably
at least a decade away.^
We are so close in time to these projections that I find it difficult to
assess them. Since no single classification scheme or indexing system can take
care of all library situations satisfactorily, the development and improvement
of what seem to be competing systems will be with us for some time.
Maltby wrote that "there are a number of fundamental questions which
profoundly concern the future of classification in general libraries, particularly
if by the term 'classification' we really mean a rational sequence of the
maximum utility and not simply a convenient pigeonholing system." He
believes that "there is an increasing gulf between the type of classification
needed for book arrangement and that required for information retrieval." ^
This quotation points to the lack of rigorous usage of terms in librarians'
professional jargon. We have often used interchangeably the terms informa-
tional retrieval and subject retrieval, treating them as synonyms or near-
synonyms. This has given rise to much confusion in teaching classification as
well as in applied classification. Many fine minds have formulated their own
definitions using one term and ignoring the other one, or using the two terms
synonomously. I believe that as librarians, we should be reminded of Henri
Bergson's warning: "On est libre de donner aux mots le sens qu'on veut,
quand on prend soin de le definir."^
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John Metcalfe concludes an article entitled "When is a Subject Not a
Subject?" with the statement that "'subject' has not proved a satisfactory
term in information retrieval because of ambiguity in its use in information at
large.
"21 The term is nevertheless here to stay in communication with library
users, but generates confusions in meaning with distinctions between the
general and the specific, and between object and aspect. "Isolate has had some
use to distinguish one of its meanings, but not without ambiguity of what
Kaiser called Concrete and Process and what Cutter with more certain breadth
of meaning called object and aspect."^2 For himself, Metcalfe intends to
continue the distinction between object and aspect. By doing so, he endorses
dialectical epistemology: the knowing subject and the known object aspect,
as he uses it, being a restriction at a conscious level of what we want to know
about the object. This can be applied to the daily library environment as
information retrieval from a subject-matter embodied in a document. I believe
that most library classifications have succeeded to some extent in providing
subject retrieval by mapping out or listing subjects, but many failed, save
those that have introduced facet analysis or similar devices, to produce
information retrieval from subjects. The editors of the Dewey Decimal
Classification made an interesting and necessary distinction between subject
and discipline as a useful device in applying that particular classification
scheme. In that case, subject would be equivalent to concept, and discipline
would fit the concept in such a priori classification schedules.
Robert Fairthorne writes: "The problem of helping those who are
ignorant, in detail, of what people have said about things, is therefore solved
by defining 'aboutness' in extension. That is by listing the things that are
mentioned in a document. . . ."^3 gu t the mere listing of things or entities
does not reveal what is said about them, because it is irrelevant to the reader
who is necessarily ignorant of what is said. Fairthorne distinguishes two kinds
of "aboutnesses": (1) extensional "aboutness" takes into account the environ-
ment of the use and the production of a document (thus it is a relation, not
an attribute); and (2) intentional "aboutness," which clearly cannot be
determined from the study of the text alone: "It entails knowledge of how it
is going to be used by what class of readers."^ While not applying entirely
William James's pragmatism to library classification, this last quotation from
Fairthorne is suggestive not only of a classification of knowledge or the
determination of the "aboutness" of a document, but also of a classification
of readers. Shera stressed that "the study of habits of use is requisite to the
act of classifying," for "there can be no universal library classification because
there is no universal library user."25
The term user habits is a catchall to cover the behavior of all kinds of
readers, from pre-readers to scholarly users. We must know more about our
readers as individuals seeking information and recreation; we must know more
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about them as members of a socioeconomic group; we must know more about
the civilization or culture to which they belong, and about the values which
they cherish. It would be a gross error to overlook differences among peoples
and nations even in the Western world; too often library classifications have
been forced upon certain groups of readers, making the use of classification as
an effective information retrieval tool almost impossible to achieve.
The use of classifications for retrieval is not an invention of modem
Western man; primitive peoples have through the ages devised taxonomies and
classifications for their own benefit. These were by no means mere intellectual
exercises, but were implements for their survival, both physical and spiritual.
Many distinguished ethnologists have collected and interpreted primitive
peoples' classifications, but none has given so much attention to their theories
as the great French philosopher and anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss. He
synthesizes the examination both of the structure of primitive thought and of
the complexity of the organization of primitive collective life. In his book,
The Savage Mind/- Levi-Strauss deals extensively with classifications of
primitive peoples. At first glance, languages of American Indians and other
primitive peoples include few terms to express concepts; lacking words like
tree or animal, their classifications are, as a rule, very detailed and enumera-
tive. Krause claims that Indians classify and name living organisms in two
main categories: useful and harmful.^ ' Anything that does not fall under one
of these two categories makes up a third category which we could consider
neutral. The study of languages will reveal that names are assigned to things
according to the particular needs of each community.
The theoretical foundations of totemic classifications, if we may be
allowed to use this term, are quite simple: classifications are devised to bring
order into the universe. According to Levi-Strauss, "classifying, as opposed to
not classifying, has a value of its own, whatever form the classification may
take."2 Classification is based on observation leading to a systematic
inventory of relations and connections that leads, sometimes, to correct
scientific results. One interesting example is classification by smell; modern
chemistry has revealed that the presence or absence of carbon, hydrogen,
oxygen, sulfur, and/or nitrogen will affect smell and taste. Botany separates
onions, garlic, cabbage, turnips, radishes, and mustard (some belonging to
the liliaceae and others to crucifers), but the olfactory sense confirms that
these plants all share one element, sulfur. Simpson has stated that the
demand for organization is a need common to art and science and, in
consequence, "taxonomy, which is ordering par excellence, has eminent
aesthetic value."^9
Any classification is superior to chaos, even when it is based on external
and artificial characteristics; it is a step toward rational ordering and is a tool
that makes the building of a memory possible.
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Among American Indians, the Navaho, who claim to be great classifiers,
have divided living beings into two categories: those endowed with speech and
those that are not; the latter includes animals and plants. Animals are then di-
vided into three groups: running, flying, and crawling.-^ These species are a
far cry from Western zoological taxonomies. Reichard writes that, "since
the Navaho regard all parts of the universe as essential to well-being, a major
problem of religious study is the classification of natural objects, a subject
that demands careful taxonomical attention."^ Of the Guarani of Argentina
and Paraguay, Dennler states:
In general, native terms can be said to constitute a well-conceived
system, and, with a pinch of salt, they can be said to bear some
resemblance to our scientific nomenclature. These primitive Indians did
not leave the naming of natural phenomena to chance. They assembled
tribal councils to decide which terms best corresponded to the nature of
species, classifying groups and sub-groups with great precision. The
preservation of the indigenous terms for the local fauna is not just a
matter of piety and integrity; it is a duty to science.32
Levi-Strauss regrets that ethnologists disregard these classifications by
concluding that they were of no value whatsoever for the study of primitive
peoples. He finds that these classifications bear a close resemblance to those
devised in ancient times and in the Middle Ages by such men as Galen, Pliny,
Hermes Tresmegistus, and Albert the Great, and are very close to Greek and
Roman plant emblematism.^^
The study of totemic classifications is fascinating; characteristics of such
classifications are quite different from one culture to another. Levi-Strauss
states that: "The terms never have any intrinsic significance. Their meaning is
one of
'position' a function of the history and cultural context on the one
hand and of the structural system in which they are called upon to appear on
the other."34 They are built on dichotomies based on values and usefulness
and are hierarchical. "The truth of the matter," writes Levi-Strauss, "is that
the principle underlying a classification can never be postulated in advance. It
can only be discovered a posteriori by ethnographic investigation, that is, by
experience."-^
It would be tempting to conclude that totemic classifications are mere
listings used to build a collective memory, but relationships between terms
make them workable. These relations are most commonly based on contiguity
or on resemblance. Formally, contiguity and resemblance play an important
part in modern classifications of knowledge; as Levi-Strauss says in regard to
Simpson's remarks:
contiguity for discovering things which "belong both structurally and
functionally ... to a single system" and resemblance, which does not
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require membership of the same system and is based simply on the
possession by objects of one or more common characteristics, such as all
being "yellow or all smooth, or all with wings or all ten feet high."36
Other kinds of relationships may be found on either the sensible level or the
intelligible level. Relations will vary from one culture to another; in fact, these
civilizations could be labeled richer or poorer "on the basis of the formal
properties of the systems of reference to which they appeal in the construc-
tion of their classifications."-^ The totemic classifications are not only
conceptualized, but lived. By pointing out some aspects of Levi-Strauss's work
on totemic classifications, I am not suggesting that we should avail ourselves
of primitive classifications, but that we might draw from these "savage minds"
their concern for usefulness, both physical and spiritual, relevant to our
late-twentieth-century, post-industrial society.
We are now familiar with Piaget, Barbel and Inhelder's findings on
classification or, more precisely, on classifying. In a contribution to the Shera
Festschrift entitled "The Contribution of Classification to a Theory of
Librarianship," D. J. Foskett summarizes the Geneva school's findings on
classification. There are two ways of forming a class: (l)by analysis (or the
separation) of things from a collection by naming their specific properties, and
(2) by synthesis (or the grouping) of things which share certain properties. It
is clear that separating and grouping can be done on the basis of more than
one property or set of properties: "Thus the processes of forming concepts
involve multiplicative classifications, or lattices, and not just single hierarchies.
Mastery of these processes brings the ability not only to form classes, but also
to identify the relations between objects that exist in the real, material
world."3
The problem of relations, even though Farradane^" hoped to have
solved it twenty years ago, is still very much with us. The PRECIS system's
relational operators are effective inasmuch as they are used with that method
of indexing, but would they be as effective in another classificatory and/or
indexing environment?
In a recent article on the future of classification, Phyllis Richmond
wrote: "We do not yet have an organizing philosophic basis for current
thought in the late twentieth century. The philosophy may be here but
unrecognized, or it may be in process but has not yet emerged publicly."^
She regrets that the Classification Research Group has no philosophical system
for the projected New General Classification. They give their attention to
Francis Bacon's Reason only, leaving aside for the time being, we hope,
Memory and Imagination.^ The future of classification in subject retrieval
may lie not only in developing a philosophical basis, but also in determining
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in which way the different fields of knowledge are interrelated by deciphering
the structures of knowledge that comprise knowledge itself.
In a remarkable book edited by Jean Piaget, Logique et conncdssance
scientifique, Piaget rejects what he calls static classifications, which he
considers artificial. The problem is to find epistemological filiations and
analogies between different forms of scientific knowledge, and the epistemo-
logical meaning of these relations, as classification is considered as a search for
noetic filiations.
Piaget posits that the dependency relation among the sciences necessarily
leads to a linear classification. In reviewing some classifications from Bacon to
Kedrov, he finds that according to Spencer's empirical epistemology, knowl-
edge comes from the object itself, the forms of the object or phenomena.
Knowledge concerning itself with forms only will produce a linear series,
where the first term will be the most abstract and the last the most concrete.
Spencer seems unaware that the abstract can be drawn not only from the
object, but also from the actions of the subject.
Piaget recalls that an epistemology is a kind of a dialectical situation
between a subject and an object. The object is known only through the
subject and the latter knows itself in relation to the object. The setting of the
foundations of logic and mathematics must therefore lie with the subject, and
the building of a science of the subject requires biology, physics and
mathematics. Auguste Comte's intent was to set a linear classification, but
epistemologically his system suggests circularity. Relations between genesis and
structures are the main problems to be faced in establishing a classification
scheme. Are structures a result of a genesis? If so, how do we explain genesis
without referring to structures? The first link contains the axiomatic sciences,
and the last contains sciences of genesis (or as Comte calls them, dynamiques).
Cournot had divided knowledge according to structures and genesis.
Disregarding Bacon's human faculties, his classification goes from the least
historical mathematics to the most historical the humanities. He also in-
troduced a third dimension: the technical or practical series.
The latest classification of the sciences has been elaborated by the
Soviet epistemologjst, B. Kedrov. Kedrov rejects what Piaget calls static
classifications, where a continuity is provided from one science to the other,
and he also rejects classifications based on usefulness. Kedrov starts with what
he calls the principles of objectivity and of subordination (or development
from inferior forms to superior forms). One must consider primarily Kedrov's
dialectics as a methodology, not as a philosophy. If one considers dialectics as
a methodology stemming from the humanities, or more exactly from psychol-
ogy and sociology, the method can go back to the starting point of
logic/mathematics to provide structures for the physical sciences and to
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I. Logic/mathematics
II. Physical sciences
III. Biological sciences
IV. Psycho-sociological sciences
A. Domaine materiel (material scope)
B. Domaine conceptuel (conceptual scope)
C. Domaine epistemologique interne (internal epistemological scope)
D. Domaine 6pistemologique de'rive' (derived epistemological scope)
Table 1. Piaget's Epistemological Levels.
contribute to a total circular system of the sciences. The problem is not one
of a structure to be given to a classification of the sciences (classifiers and
classificationists cannot modify the real world); the problem is rather whether
the sciences, in their spontaneous evolution, will reveal linear and hierarchical
structures or cyclic and interdependent structures. Is knowledge developing as
a living organism where all organs are interconnected, or is it developing by
subordination in a preferred field?
Piaget has worked for more than thirty years on his proposed system of
classification. His hypothesis is that the system of the sciences bears a circular
structure, not a linear structure. He divides knowledge into four broad classes:
I. logic/mathematics; II. physical sciences; III. biological sciences; IV. psycho-
sociological sciences, including linguistics, economics, etc. (see Table 1).
At first glance, the proper order would appear to be I, II, III, IV, with a
possibility of an internal interaction between IV and II, and I and III,
discarding, therefore, a I to IV fixed sequence ending at IV. This is not an
arbitrary order; there are relations between the classes. The meaning and the
nature of these relations must be defined, for it would otherwise be totally
absurd to link mathematics to psychology: while the latter relies on experi-
mentation, the first relies on deduction. Piaget develops the hypothesis of the
circle of the sciences by distinguishing different kinds of dependence:
"reduction" or filiation between the sciences.
A first distinction must be recognized before establishing relations
between different fields of knowledge and the use of these relations to build a
natural classification (natural meaning here "adapted to the nature of these
relations without any reference to the distinction between nature in general
and ideal or transcendental realities").
The distinction lies between the domaine materiel the material scope or
matter of a science, i.e., the set of objects with which it concerns itself (for
example, numbers and functions for mathematics; bodies, energies and organs
for physics and biology) and the domaine conceptuel the conceptual scope or
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set of theories or organized knowledge of a particular science about its object
(for instance, the theory of numbers, the theories of masses and energies, the
description and interpretation of biological organs, the analysis of mental
phenomena). The material scope will be labeled IA, IIA, IIIA, IVA; and the
conceptual scope IB, IIB, IIIB, IVB. It is perfectly acceptable to relate the
material scope of IA logic mathematics and IVA psycho-sociology; this has
been done by empiricists who have "reduced" logic/mathematics to language;
Piaget, however, derives them from the general coordinations of action.
On the other hand, it would be rather clumsy to relate the conceptual
scope of IB logic/mathematics to IVB psycho-sociology; the mathematician
does not consult a psychologist before formulating a theory of numbers or
complex functions. It is therefore possible to draw a circular classification at
the level of material scope, but the conceptual scope remains linear. It is
worth noting that classificationists have more or less taken this dichotomy
into account when devising their systems. When Comte discards psychology
and inserts its object in biology and sociology, he deals with the material
scope. The observations, theories and experiments belonging to the conceptual
scope are not altered whether psychology is classed in biology or sociology.
One might say that most classifications are concerned with the material
scope exclusively. However, knowledge about a science is not developed on
one level only; different levels of knowledge proceed from the conceptu-
alization (B) of its object (A) to an inquiry into that conceptualization, which
in turn leads to a critical examination, or to the internal epistemological
scope. This third level will be assigned the letter C and is defined as the set of
theories whose objectives are the criticism or the study of the foundations of
the conceptual scope. The four main classes of this level will thus be: 1C, IIC,
IIIC, and IVC.
The study of the foundations of a science will eventually yield general
epistemological problems such as the part of the subject and the contribution
of the object to knowledge. A fourth level, D, derived epistemological scope,
will accommodate the general epistemological results of comparing one science
with other sciences. The problem will then deal with relations between the
subject and the object. It is therefore essential that this level ID, IID, HID,
IVD be considered separately, because IVD concerns itself with psychogenesis
and sociogenesis, and thus constitutes an indispensable part of genetic
psychology. Obviously, epistemologies C and D refer equally to the material
scope A and to the conceptual scope B, because their concern is the critical
examination of concepts B in relation to their object A. Classifications
according to B and C will remain linear, whereas a cyclic structure will be
found in A and D, since the study of the subject in the building of the
logico/mathematical structures is already an object in IVD.
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Figure 1. Piaget's Circle of the Sciences.
Piaget concludes that a dynamic classification of the sciences takes into
account the four levels of knowledge because they are interdependent. He
then exhibits the relations between the subject and the object. Relations of
succession may differ according to the levels considered: for levels A and D
the order appears circular, while for B and C it appears linear. On the
hypothesis of a circular order of the sciences, Piaget distinguishes two kinds of
relations: causal and implicative. The causal relations belong to the physical
and biological sciences to their material object. On the other hand, mental
states such as feelings, values, and obligations are not causes, but imply
something; we call them, therefore, implicative relations. If the circle of the
subject and the object produces a cyclic structure to the whole of the
sciences, it is because there is a dialectic or circular relation between
classification systems based on causality and those based on implication.
Having defined these types of relations, Piaget distinguishes six types of
dependence. These are: (1) unilateral reduction of a science or causal theory
to another; (2) reduction by interdependence of sciences or causal theories;
(3) correspondence between a causal system and an implicative system until
the first is assimilated by the second; (4) correspondence between a causal
system and an implicative system, with a search towards an isomorphism or a
structure; (5) interdependence by abstraction between two implicative systems;
and (6) reduction by axiomatization of two implicative systems.
Piaget's basic concept of the relations among the sciences can be
expressed by the drawing of a circle: it takes its origin in logic/mathematics
and closes also in logic/mathematics. He concludes that the material scope
(A) is circular, given the fifth and sixth types of dependence, where logic
belongs equally to levels A and D. The conceptual scope (B) is linear; logic
tends to consider all circles as vicious. The internal epistemological scope
(C) is linear, for approximately the same reasons as were applicable for B.
Finally, the derived epistemological scope (D) is circular. Piaget grants that the
limits between C and D might be somewhat difficult to determine. The
epistemological results obtained in C in a given science may prove valid in
another science. The circularity of A and D remains hypothetical until the
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types of dependence have been set and proved to exist. The proof of the
circularity of both A and D is obtained by the application of Piaget's
dialectical epistemology: the subject knows the object through his own action
performed on the object, and knows itself insofar as it is affected by the
object. Empiristic philosophy draws knowledge from the object alone; aprio-
ristic philosophy from the subject alone.
I am very much aware that Piaget's circular classification might be
indeed difficult to apply to a practical library and information-oriented
environment, but I believe it is worth investigating. Regarding knowledge per
se, his system has set its own limitations; it does not provide for knowledge
that is not scientific, such as practical knowledge, beliefs, opinions, values, and
what Erikson calls
"intimacy with the domain," which includes knowledge
acquired by connoisseurs of the fine arts and music, sports fans, serious
collectors, etc.
These considerations, some far-fetched, should not deter us from trying
to cope with the more mundane, day-to-day problems that we face in libraries.
Among these problems is the "tandem" close vs. broad classification exists
only in library situations where the classification scheme serves two purposes:
shelf location and subject analysis (in its broadest meaning). Theoretically,
there is no physical limit to minute classification in catalogs, whether manual
or automated. But if the classification scheme selected serves as a location
device, truncation is possible without more or less loss of meaning if the
notation is hierarchically expressive whatever applies to the whole applies to
the parts. I cannot imagine truncation applied to other types of notations that
do not express hierarchy without severe loss of meaning.
In November 1973, the Library and Learning Resources Service of the
City of London Polytechnic conducted a survey in which problems on
automation brought questions on the length of DDC-18 class numbers as
allocated by the British National Bibliography (BNB). In this survey, it was
decided to investigate the possibility of truncating numbers in a select group
of classes which reflect the collections held by that particular institution,
without too much loss of information. Results of the study indicated that:
Specificity of classing is a principle well established in texts on
classification and in practical classification as carried out by LC and
BNB. Truncating numbers either on a rigid basis of X digits after the
decimal point or using the prime marks as suggested in the DC 18
Editor's Introduction (vol. 1, p. 41) inevitably reduces specificity and
merges topics.^3
The surveyors found that one of the features of class 300 and especially
330, 380 and 350 were long numbers resulting from additions from the Area
Tables and the use of "add as" instructions, particularly in 300 and 380. They
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also felt that: "the 5- and 7-digit levels are unacceptable and that if truncation
is to take place it should be at the 9-digit level. ... If we take into account
the fact that class numbers are not always coextensive with the subject
matter, then the true picture is even worse.
"^4
The surveyors recommended that more research is needed to determine
the relative costs of:
1 . The extra staff and user effort in searching a non specific catalog and
shelves.
2. The extent to which users do not find a book because of long class
numbers (unable to memorize or writing it down wrongly).
3. The extent to which users are put off from using the catalogue.
4. The difference in staff tidying and shelving times/*-*
The results of such an investigation would apply exclusively to a library
environment where the three following conditions would be met: (l)open
shelves, (2) classification is used for shelf location and subject analysis (in its
broadest meaning), and (3) the scheme used is DDC or another scheme whose
notation is decimal or lends itself to truncation without loss of meaning. It
would also entail reassessment of the research and educational value of open
stacks, self-service, and browsing.
Maltby has stated that: "there is an increasing gulf between the type of
classification needed for book arrangement and that required for information
retrieval. . . . The dichotomy is now too certain for any one scheme to be
viewed with confidence as a classification for all situations.'"^" He writes
further that: "Broad classification, apart from the effect on cataloguing and
the uncertainty of interpretation as to just what constitutes 'broad shelf
arrangement; is at best often little more than a ruined shell of the scheme
represented.'"*'
The classified catalog is not theoretically bound to an exact matching of
class numbers on books and catalog cards. In libraries maintaining this kind of
catalog, the books may be arranged on the shelves in any orderly fashion; it
may be by accession number, it may be by a classification scheme totally
different from the one selected for the catalog, or according to the classifica-
tion scheme used in the catalog, matching exactly the principal class number
assigned to the catalog, or a broader class number than the one selected as the
principal number for the catalog.
It is not within the scope of this paper to analyze the components of
the classified catalog, nor its virtues and weaknesses; eminent librarians such as
Shera and Egan/* Ranganathan,^^ and R. F. Kennedy~>0 have treated with
great intellectual rigor this tool for subject retrieval. I will, however, comment
briefly on the few remaining or recently closed classified catalogs on this
continent.
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Among the most important classified catalogs recently closed are those
of the Boston University Library and the National Library of Canada. Each of
these catalogs was constructed quite differently: the Boston University catalog
was a far cry from the rules on the construction of a classified catalog as set
forth by Shera and Egan and by Ranganathan; LCC class numbers were used
in the classified list, and LC subject headings were used for the index, matching as
far as possible the class numbers assigned to the classified file.
The National Library of Canada catalog was begun in 1961 and closed
in 1974. It was
"arranged in Dewey Decimal Classification order [with]
indexes in English and French established according to the technique of chain
indexing."^ LCC class numbers were assigned to books.
According to Margaret Hazen, the Boston University Library catalog
"had a serious drawback namely, the difficulty of keeping the subject records
current,"-^ resulting in a serious backlog. The development of LC MARC
tapes and "the introduction of cooperative cataloging by member libraries in
the OCLC [Ohio College Library Center] system provided a possible method
for achieving speed and efficiency in subject and general cataloging."-^
Boston University became a member of the New England Library Network,
accepting LC call numbers and subject headings, and began an alphabetic
subject catalog. Standardization is the main reason behind the abandonment
of the classified catalog. The same reason prevailed in the closing of the
National Library of Canada catalog:
The decision was made because of the need for greater standardization
and the ensuing possibility of sharing cataloguing information, thus
providing access to the collection more rapidly and decreasing catalogu-
ing costs. . . . Although the classed catalogue has proved to be an
efficient subject retrieval tool, it could not hold against the current
trends. $$
In Quebec, where the classified catalog enjoyed some popularity, large
and small libraries have converted or are considering converting or closing
their classified catalogs. Again, the reason is standardization: to bring, for the
time being, research and academic libraries in line with Ontario libraries as
members of UNICAT/TELECAT (a program of cooperative cataloging based
on OCLC) with the addition of a bilingual (English and French) union file.
If we claim that subject indexing is equivalent to classification, then
alphabetical subject catalogs will not alleviate defective classification. J.E. Daily
has written: "One must assume that language, in its broadest sense, affects the
subject indexing and that there is no distinct difference between classification,
which is identified by its structure of notation, and the alphabetical list,
however organized. Subject indexing is a classification process."-*" The
Encyclopedic^ is an alphabetical dictionary, but Diderot states that refer-
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ences between words are the most important part of the work; the intent of
the "renvois" is obviously classificatory.
The future of classification for information retrieval lies in the confron-
tation of economics and the intrinsic value of research and its application.
Valuable advances have been made and successfully applied in the classifica-
tion and subject indexing of science and technology. Unfortunately, the
humanities and the social sciences have been poorly served, and deserve more
investigation in order to provide meaningful subject access. Any new venture
is costly, and the economics will weigh heavily in adopting or rejecting
systems applicable to a particular library. This is why standardization,
regardless of its worth, has gained so many supporters.
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